Improving Function Coverage with Munch: A Hybrid Fuzzing and Directed
  Symbolic Execution Approach by Ognawala, Saahil et al.
Improving Function Coverage with Munch: A Hybrid
Fuzzing and Directed Symbolic Execution Approach
Saahil Ognawala, Thomas Hutzelmann, Eirini Psallida, Alexander Pretschner
Technical University of Munich, Germany
{saahil.ognawala, t.hutzelmann, eirini.psallida, alexander.pretschner}@tum.de
Abstract— Fuzzing and symbolic execution are popular tech-
niques for finding vulnerabilities and generating test-cases for
programs. Fuzzing, a blackbox method that mutates seed input
values, is generally incapable of generating diverse inputs that
exercise all paths in the program. Due to the path-explosion prob-
lem and dependence on SMT solvers, symbolic execution may
also not achieve high path coverage. A hybrid technique involv-
ing fuzzing and symbolic execution may achieve better function
coverage than fuzzing or symbolic execution alone. In this paper,
we present Munch, an open-source framework implementing
two hybrid techniques based on fuzzing and symbolic execution.
We empirically show using nine large open-source programs that
overall, Munch achieves higher (in-depth) function coverage than
symbolic execution or fuzzing alone. Using metrics based on total
analyses time and number of queries issued to the SMT solver,
we also show that Munch is more efficient at achieving better
function coverage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fuzzing and symbolic execution often do not achieve high
coverage, not only at the source code, binary, or any intermedi-
ate code levels but also at the component level. Components of
software are its basic building blocks, such as classes in object
oriented programming or functions in functional programming.
Component coverage, thus, may be defined as the number of
components in a program that are executed at least once during
a software testing cycle. Low component coverage can be ob-
served particularly frequently for components that can only be
reached via many other components in a chain of components
[28, 6]. It is also true for scenarios where components may
be reused across programs, e.g., in the form of open APIs
[12], or when they are developed by different teams. Low
component coverage intuitively increases the probability that
vulnerabilities in uncovered components lying deep inside a
program remain undiscovered.
Automated methods for discovering such vulnerabilities can
be classified into two categories. Blackbox testing methods
are oblivious to the inner workings of the system under test
(SUT). Whitebox methods, on the other hand, take into account
the programs’ underlying structure, via source code, software
model or any other intermediate representation, to derive effi-
cient testing strategies. Most testing methods in practice can
be placed on a spectrum between blackbox and whitebox (also
called greybox), depending on the available information about
the SUTs. Fuzzing, or fuzz testing [29], is an example of a
(mostly) blackbox testing methodology. Fuzzing works with
and modifies – often user-supplied – test-cases to discover
new, previously unseen, functionality in a software. The mod-
ification (mutation) of test-cases depends on heuristics that are
expected to help discover new program paths. Due to its obliv-
ion w.r.t. SUTs’ implementations, fuzzing may miss program
paths that are unlikely to be executed with randomly mutated
input. Such program paths may even involve branches that are
close to one of the entry points of a program, but difficult to
enter anyway.
Symbolic execution (or its practical approaches, e.g., con-
colic execution [26] or whitebox fuzzing [15]), a whitebox
method, is a deterministic method that uses instrumentation
to dynamically collect constraints representing branching con-
ditions in a program and solves these constraints to generate
inputs that execute different paths in a program. However, due
to its reliance on SMT solvers and the problem of path explo-
sion [10], symbolic execution may get “stuck” in the shallow
parts of a program and never reach (and solve) branches that
lie deeper.
In this paper, we introduce a framework that increases
function coverage at all depths of C-programs by combining
fuzzing and concolic execution. We define function coverage
in C programs as follows: If a function (other than main) has
been called by another (parent) function at least once during
all executions of a program, it is said to be covered; otherwise,
it is said to be uncovered. Our technique makes use of KLEE
[11] for symbolic execution, and AFL [1, 2] for fuzzing.
We have augmented KLEE with a targeted search strategy,
based on a shortest path search algorithm (section III-B2). We
also present evaluation results of our framework on several
open-source programs, demonstrating the effectiveness of our
method.
Problem: Fuzzing and symbolic execution by themselves
often do not achieve high function coverage in all depths of a
program. Shallow coverage means high coverage in parts of a
program that are close to the entry point, and low coverage in
parts that are more distant from them, or “deeper” in the call-
graph. Symbolic execution tools tend to achieve shallow cover-
age in a limited time because the underlying constraint solvers
(e.g., SMT solvers) take too long to return. Fuzzing tools,
similarly, are unable to cover deeply located functions whose
entry points are guarded by branching conditions that are hard
to pass. Without proper coverage at all depths, both these
techniques may fail to discover non-trivial vulnerabilities.
Solution: Our framework, Munch, combines fuzzing and
symbolic execution in two ways to increase function cover-
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age: 1) Use fuzzing (with manual seed-inputs) for an initial
exploration of the programs and, then, use targeted symbolic
execution to explore those functions that were not covered
by fuzzing. And, 2) Use symbolic execution for generating
a functionally diverse set of test-cases that are, then, used
to fuzz the program. We hypothesize that both these hybrid
approaches achieve higher function coverage, also of deeply
located functions, at a lower cost (time) than fuzzing or sym-
bolic execution alone.
Contribution: 1) Responding to a gap in research and
tools in this direction, we implement targeted search function-
ality in KLEE, for reaching (and, then, exploring) arbitrary
function entry points. 2) We implement two hybrid approaches
that treat the bottlenecks of SMT solvers by reducing the
number of queries issued by the symbolic execution tool.
Because of an initial exploratory phase with fuzzer (in one
hybrid method), those functions whose entry points could be
reached easily are excluded from the state search by symbolic
execution engine and, hence, more time can be devoted to
harder-to-reach functions. We demonstrate these approaches
and evaluate the gain in efficiency on artificially generated
and real-world programs. 3) To the best of our knowledge, we
provide the first empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of a
hybrid framework on real-world (9 open-source) programs. We
show that when running for less time, our approach achieves
higher function coverage than both fuzzing and symbolic ex-
ecution alone, especially deep in the call-graph where both
naı¨ve methods result in low coverage. The reason is that we
can drastically reduce the number of calls to the constraint
solver. 4) Finally, to the best of our knowledge, our framework,
Munch, is the only open-source hybrid testing framework that
can be used out-of-the-box for any C program.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. On the grounds
of artificially crafted programs, we motivate the problem in
section II. We describe our techniques and present details
of implemented modules of our framework in section III. In
section IV we discuss our evaluation metrics, results, and their
limitations. Section V discusses related work. We conclude in
section VI.
II. MOTIVATION
Using artificially generated C programs, we first demon-
strate that fuzzing and symbolic execution are ineffective re-
garding function coverage in large programs. Addressing in-
adequate function coverage and reliance on SMT solvers, we
demonstrate the need for a more efficient way to reach deeper
functions.
We generated C programs with a script that takes as input
the desired branching factor, b, for all generated functions and
the depth of the call-graph of the program, d. These programs
require users to provide input between 0 and bd− 1. The cor-
responding call-graph of an artificial program with branching
factor of 2 and call-graph depth of 3 is shown in fig. 1. For
this program, a valid user input lies between 0 and 7 (23−1).
The whole range of integers between upper and lower limit of
valid inputs is then progressively split into half, with each half
range being the argument to a corresponding function until
a function (leaf node in the call-graph) is reached where the
input is printed on the screen. For our evaluation, we generated
programs for call-graph depths from 1 up to 4, for branching
factors 2 up to 4 (total 12 programs).
b5 b6b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b7
i0_1 i2_3 i4_5 i6_7
i0_3 i4_7
i0_7
main
Fig. 1. Call-graph of an artificially generated program – with branching factor
of 2 and call-graph depth of 3
Function coverage achieved by fuzzing (AFL) and symbolic
execution (KLEE) on all 12 artificially generated programs are
shown in tab. I. AFL does not achieve a desirable function
coverage, even for programs that do not contain any complex
branching conditions, large input buffers or input-dependent
loops. Using KLEE, function coverage is always 100%. How-
ever, we also need to consider the quantity of SMT solver
queries that KLEE issues, for either checking validity of new
states, or generating test cases for valid paths [11]. One can
see from the 8th column of tab. I that the number of solver
queries issued by KLEE is much higher than the number of
distinct branches in the corresponding program. FS stands
for Fuzzing+Symbolic execution, which is a simple hybrid
technique where, first, the program is fuzzed for a limited
amount of time and, then, symbolic execution is used to target
those functions which were not covered during fuzzing. We
explain this technique and the corresponding improvement
achieved w.r.t. artificially generated programs in section III
and section IV. The number of queries issued by KLEE here
is very high and indicates a bottleneck, possibly increasing
cost in terms of analysis time. In fact, as we will see in more
detail in section IV-B, this trend affects real-world programs
more severely where complex branching conditions, loops, and
external calls are, naturally, more common than in the artificial
programs.
Looking at the performance of fuzzing and symbolic ex-
ecution we claim that both techniques, by themselves, are
inadequate in achieving high functional coverage efficiently
(i.e. overall analysis time). Fuzzing does not generate sufficient
diversity in inputs to cover all functions in a program, and
symbolic execution spends too much time in SMT solvers. To
deal with these limitations of fuzzing and symbolic execution,
we now propose a hybrid methodology to achieve high func-
TABLE I
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P1 2 1 4 25 100 100 4648 56
P2 2 2 8 25 100 100 4971 154
P3 2 3 16 19 100 100 5250 63
P4 2 4 32 22 100 100 5783 603
P5 3 1 5 40 100 100 4790 326
P6 3 2 14 36 100 100 5471 1169
P7 3 3 41 34 100 100 6390 3540
P8 3 4 122 34 100 100 9614 6295
P9 4 1 6 33 100 100 5248 479
P10 4 2 22 32 100 100 5832 2716
P11 4 3 86 27 100 100 8327 3871
P12 4 4 342 25 100 100 11845 6143
tion coverage at all depths of the program in an effective and
efficient manner.
III. METHODOLOGY
Munch1 is an adaptive framework that can operate in two
hybrid modes. We start this section with a high level descrip-
tion of both modes and, then, give some low level details of
the main components of Munch that implement these high
level steps.
A. Modes of Operation
1) FS Hybrid: FS stands for Fuzzing+Symbolic execution,
in that order. In this variant of the hybrid strategy, we fuzz the
program for a limited amount of time, compute the function
coverage achieved by the fuzzer and, then, use directed (or
targeted) symbolic execution to reach those functions that
were not covered by the fuzzer. When a program is fuzzed for
a limited amount of time those functions would be covered,
ideally, that are easy to reach (in the program’s call-graph) for
most mutations of the seed-inputs. Using sonar-search, a
custom path-search strategy in our symbolic execution engine,
as described in section III-B2, FS strategy eliminates paths to
those functions that are already covered by fuzzing, thereby
taking some load off the constraint solver.
As the reader would have noted, FS hybrid requires the user
to provide seed inputs for the first step of fuzzing. Therefore,
FS hybrid is particularly useful in those cases where sample
inputs for programs are available or can be quickly (manually)
generated, especially for file based input.
2) SF Hybrid: For programs where seed inputs may not be
easily available or generated, Munch provides a second vari-
ant of hybrid greybox fuzzing, called SF hybrid strategy. SF
stands for Symbolic execution+Fuzzing, in that order. In this
1Munch can be downloaded at https://github.com/tum-i22/munch
variant, we symbolically execute the program under test for
a limited amount of time, providing, where needed, symbolic
command line arguments, symbolic standard input (STDIN)
and symbolic file inputs. With the first round of symbolic ex-
ecution, hopefully, those functions are covered that are called
by diverse inputs. However, due to the bottleneck of constraint
solvers, symbolic execution can only achieve shallow cover-
age. To deal with the shallow coverage of symbolic execution,
we use the inputs (standard arguments, STDIN or files) gen-
erated by symbolic execution as seed inputs for the fuzzer, as
the second step of SF hybrid technique. Due to the diverse,
albeit shallow, nature of coverage achieved by symbolic exe-
cution, the generated test-cases provide enough diversity in the
seed inputs for the fuzzer to trigger different (and, hopefully,
deeper) behaviour in the program that is harder to trigger with
manually generated seed inputs.
B. Components of Munch
To adaptively implement the two modes of operation, as
described in section III-A, common cores of fuzzing and sym-
bolic execution are used and the overall operation is managed
by our Orchestrator component. We now describe these three
components below.
1) AFL for fuzzing: For fuzzing the programs, Munch em-
ploys AFL (American Fuzzy Lop) [1], a tool that uses initial
test-cases and genetic mutations to generate new test cases.
AFL works with target binaries that accept input either directly
from STDIN or a file. AFL receives seed inputs directly from
the Orchestrator (section III-B3), which is also responsible for
adapting the program to convert command line arguments to
STDIN, for some special cases. Our framework, then, fuzzes
the program binary for a specific time that we later elaborate
in section IV.
2) KLEE for symbolic execution: Munch adapts and uses
KLEE [11] as its symbolic execution engine. For SF mode
of operation, that starts with symbolic execution, KLEE is
called by the Orchestrator with the path-search strategy of
KLEE that is optimized for exploring new unseen paths first
[11]. However, for FS mode of operation of Munch, we need
a targeted search strategy to arbitrary function entry points.
Since the original implementation of KLEE does not provide
such a strategy, we extended it with a search strategy that
prioritizes shortest paths to target functions.
Prototypes, albeit without full implementations or for differ-
ent languages, for targeted symbolic execution have been pro-
posed in the past [18, 21, 24]. Our implementation is inspired
by these works, but we modified them so that it takes as input
the control-flow-graph and call-graph of a program instead
of only original source code, for computing shortest distance.
Additionally, our implementation uses KLEE’s native search
heuristic as a nested searcher in the following way: after a
state has reached the target function, all consecutive states
are explored using KLEE’s native heuristic. Along the way to
the target function, all states that cannot reach the target are
terminated immediately, thereby reducing the number of paths
to be explored by KLEE. The complete search strategy, with
nested KLEE heuristic searcher, is named sonar-search
in our KLEE fork2 (because, like sonar waves, we constantly
compute distances in the call-graph in a bottom-up fashion
and update the searcher).
3) Orchestrator: The central component that coordinates
the working of the fuzzer and symbolic execution engines
is the Orchestrator. In addition to this coordination task, Or-
chestrator is also responsible for generating useful statistics
needed for the correct functioning in both modes of operation.
Concretely, Orchestrator’s functions are as follows
1) Lift the call-graph from a compiled LLVM bitcode of the
program3.
2) Sort the list of functions in topological order. The reason
for topologically sorting the list of all functions is that if
sonar-search reaches a frontier node, it is likely that
other functions below the level of this frontier node in
the call-graph might get covered in the same run of FS
hybrid mode.
A frontier node is defined as a function node with a
relatively complex guard condition before its entry point
and which has a dense sub-(call) graph attached below it.
Example of a frontier node is a function that parses an
incoming HTTP packet and checks if the packet headers
are consistent with the protocol, the Content-Length
field conveys true information about the payload etc. Only
if the incoming packet header meets the validity criteria
defined by an intricate constraint system (guard condi-
tion), does the parsing function send the payload down
to other processing functions (e.g. fetching query results
from the backend).
3) Start Munch by reading a local (to the program under
test) configuration file written in JSON format. The mode
of operation depends on whether the test-case location
contains any text files (FS) or not (SF).
4) If the program accepts command line arguments, patch
the source-code before compiling to convert command
line arguments to STDIN. This is done with a simple
wrapper around the main function.
5) Initiate fuzzing (FS mode) or symbolic execution (SF
mode).
6) If operating in the FS mode, read afl-cov [2] coverage
information to compute the list of uncovered functions to
be used for targeted symbolic execution.
7) If operating in the SF mode, read KLEE test-cases and
populate the test-case location.
8) Initiate symbolic execution (once for every uncovered
function) with a user-defined time limit per function (FS
mode) or fuzzing (SF mode).
9) Finally, compute the function coverage.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the experiment design to
evaluate our methodology w.r.t. function coverage, depth of
2Our KLEE fork can be downloaded at https://github.com/tum-i22/
klee22/tree/sonar
3We only consider the functions that are reachable from main.
TABLE II
LIST OF EVALUATED PROGRAMS
Program Short description
Bc An interactive mathematical shell
Bzip2 Data compressor for single files
Diff Data comparison tool
Flex Fast lexical analyzer
Grep Unix based pattern matching for plain-text files
Jq JSON file and stream editor
Lz4 A fast and lossless compression algorithm
Sed Unix based stream editor
Zopfli An alternative Gzip compression method
coverage and the number of calls to the SMT solver, and
compare these aspects to pure symbolic execution and fuzzing.
Then we discuss our findings in the context of evaluated
programs, and the extent to which they may be generalized to
other programs.
A. Experiments
To demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our ap-
proach on real-world programs, we evaluated it on 9 open-
source C-programs. Tab. II lists all evaluated programs with
a short description of their respective functionalities.
For evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of Munch,
we ran experiments with, both, FS and SF modes of operation
on all 9 programs. For FS mode, we used a repository of test-
cases (manually written by us) to start the first step with AFL.
For example, for bc, we created a plaintext file containing the
seed inputs, as shown in listing 1.
Listing 1. Seed input text file for program Bc.
1+3∗7+(2−5)
1 7 / ( 1 + 2 + 3 )
8 / ( 1 + ( 2 ∗ 4 + ( 5 + 9 ) ) )
For SF mode, we examined the program manuals to gather
the minimum requirements w.r.t. lengths of command line
arguments, STDIN and/or file inputs and used these lengths
on the symbolic input for KLEE. It was essential to use the
minimum requirements here because, due to the peculiarities in
its modeling of libc environment, the time taken by KLEE to
solve symbolic file related constraints increases exponentially
with file size, if external libc functions such as fgets or
fgetc are called, instead of fscanf.
Finally, for comparison with pure symbolic execution and
fuzzing, we used the same parameters (except timeouts) for
KLEE and AFL as we used in the SF and FS respectively.
The maximum time limits used for analyzing various pro-
grams are shown in tab. III. We decided to give a bigger time-
out value to KLEE and AFL to show that (section IV-B), even
in almost half as much allowed time, Munch is more effective
at discovering new functions. Please note that these timeout
values were not always reached, especially in FS mode, which
finished earlier.
B. Results
We now evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of Munch.
TABLE III
TIME LIMITS FOR ALL FOUR METHODS
Method Time
Fuzzing 5 hours
Symbolic execution 5 hours
FS hybrid 1 hour (Fuzzing) +
2 mins (sonar-search) per
uncovered function
SF hybrid 1 hour (Symbolic execution) +
1 hours (Fuzzing)
1) Effectiveness:
a) Function coverage: We now evaluate the effective-
ness of our method on real-world programs. Fig. 2 shows the
number of functions covered by fuzzing, symbolic execution
and two described hybrid methods. It also shows the number
of functions that were covered by all the indicated techniques.
For example, the fourth bar in fig. 2 shows that 47% of the
functions, on average, were covered by, both, SF and FS hy-
brid. Similarly, 44% of the functions, on average, were covered
by, both, AFL and FS hybrid, and so on.
Results for function coverage criteria are shown in tab. IV.
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We see in the table that the number of functions covered
by our proposed hybrid methods was mostly higher than both,
fuzzing and symbolic execution when used just by themselves.
This is especially remarkable considering that the total time
taken by both variants of hybrid technique is less than half
than that taken by fuzzing or symbolic execution alone. This
can be trivially explained for fuzzing in the same way as the
explanation given in section II.
The intuition for a higher function coverage than pure sym-
bolic execution is as follows. At every branching condition in
a program, symbolic execution adds it (and its negation) to
the current path-condition and solves it (using SMT solvers)
to determine whether the condition is satisfiable. Many times,
such as for frontier nodes, these path-conditions become too
complex for the SMT solver to solve in a reasonably short
amount of time and, hence, the symbolic execution engine
does not have enough time to explore all the nodes below
frontier nodes in a call-graph.
Fuzzing tools, such as AFL, on the other hand, generate
many input mutations in a short amount of time so that, even
though many branches remain unexplored, all functions on
any program path, starting from main to a leaf node, are
covered. If the mutation strategy is fast enough, as is the case
with AFL, it becomes more likely that the random mutations
generate enough diversity in the inputs to cover more unseen
functions, compared to a strategy which blocks execution until
the satisfiability of all branching conditions along the way, is
proven.
Despite the overall higher coverage achieved by our hybrid
methods than symbolic execution or fuzzing, we observed for
a few programs that the number of functions that were only
covered by hybrid method and not by the other two was rather
small. Even though we do not accept this as a failure on
the part of hybrid methods (because symbolic execution or
fuzzing, by themselves, are not able to find as many functions
as our technique does), we discuss in section IV-C the limita-
tions of our fuzzing and symbolic execution engines that lead
to this gap in coverage by the hybrid technique.
b) Coverage depth: In the previous subsection, we dis-
cussed reasons for higher function coverage with hybrid
fuzzing and targeted symbolic execution. However, the num-
ber of functions covered is not enough to demonstrate the
benefits of a hybrid approach. Specifically, we show that, with
our adaptive hybrid framework, it is possible to cover more
functions in all depths of a program’s call-graph than either
fuzzing or symbolic execution. We consider this to be an
important metric because, in our experience, fuzzing misses a
lot of vulnerabilities in “lesser called” functions of a program
and symbolic execution misses them in deeper functions of a
program that end up having low path coverage.
To demonstrate this effect, we performed an analysis on the
covered and uncovered functions of all analyzed programs,
w.r.t. the depth in the corresponding call-graph. Depth of a
function in call-graph is defined with the usual definition of
node depth in trees, i.e. the minimum number of edges from
the node (function) to the root node (main function) of the
tree. In this subsection, we aim to evaluate depth-wise cover-
age by our two hybrid approaches and compare it to those of
fuzzing and symbolic execution.
Fig. 3 shows the average function coverage at all depths of
call-graph of all the analyzed programs. As per the figure, we
can observe that 1) Function coverage for symbolic execution
(generally) degenerates with increasing call-graph depth. It is
also the highest at low depths, and lowest at high depths.
2) Function coverage for fuzzing (generally) degenerates with
increasing call-graph depth. However, at some point around
medium depth, it increases and almost coincides with the
hybrid technique’s coverage. And, 3) Function coverage with,
both, FS and SF hybrid techniques also (generally) degenerates
TABLE IV
FUNCTION COVERAGE BY FOUR TECHNIQUES
Coverage
(%)
Time
(mins)
Solver queries
(#)
Prog. kLOC # func-tions AFL KLEE FS SF AFL KLEE FS SF KLEE FS SF
Bc 3.5 113 30 29 57 32 300 300 113 120 5227 2141 207
Bzip2 3.3 93 53 30 57 53 300 300 100 120 1430 167 167
Diff 7.8 197 39 23 58 23 300 300 125 120 9904 1918 65
Flex 6.5 217 68 18 70 68 300 300 128 120 151 27 14
Grep 8.0 192 13 19 39 28 300 300 170 120 41941 4229 29984
Jq 8.9 406 74 40 76 58 300 300 101 120 3505 1921 6
Lz4 4.7 94 24 69 73 57 300 300 126 120 3556 1969 97
Sed 3.2 125 42 73 60 86 300 300 110 120 23149 1684 21021
Zopfli 1.9 99 92 18 92 89 300 300 65 120 79296 1507 46
Avg. 5.3 170 48 36 64 55 300 300 115 120 18684 1729 5734
with call-graph depth. However, the steepness of coverage
decline with these methods is lower than both, symbolic exe-
cution and fuzzing.
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Fig. 3. Average (over all analyzed open-source programs) function coverage
(%) at all depths of call-graph(s)
From these observations, we may, firstly, reiterate our claim
from sec. IV-B1a that symbolic execution fails to cover many
functions that lie at high depths of a call-graph because the
execution is blocked until the satisfiability of each of the
branching conditions on the way is determined by the SMT
solver. Secondly, KLEE achieves much higher coverage than
AFL at low depths of a program, due to the fuzzer’s inability
to “guess” the solutions to many branching conditions. This
can also be explained by looking at the nature of our analyzed
programs. Most of these programs are full of text parsing
and/or sanitization in low depths of the program, before expos-
ing the input buffer to the functionality. This is true for most
programs that we analyzed, such as Grep, Flex, Sed and Diff.
Thirdly, these results confirm our claim that a hybrid technique
involving fast test-case generation (fuzzing) and deterministic
path exploration (symbolic execution) should lead to better
function coverage at all depths of the call-graph than either
than either of the two involved techniques alone.
Our results, however, raise a question about coverage
achieved by FS hybrid at high depths of programs. It can
be argued that by directly targeting functions not covered by
fuzzing, targeted symbolic execution should perform at least
as well as symbolic execution alone. However, this was not
always true for real-world programs that we analyzed, because
of a technical drawback that we explain in section IV-C.
2) Efficiency:
a) Efficiency on artificial programs: We first go back to
the motivating examples of artificially generated programs in
section II. Recall that, as seen in tab. I, fuzzing was unable
to achieve acceptable function coverage for these programs.
Symbolic execution, however, was able to cover all functions
in all programs, but with an alarmingly high number of queries
issued to the underlying SMT solvers. We also see in tab. I that
the total number of SMT solver queries issued by FS hybrid
approach of Munch is consistently much lower than symbolic
execution alone. Even though, qualitatively, these queries were
sufficiently easy for the SMT solver to solve before timing
out, these results indicate that our hybrid technique reduces
the reliance on SMT solvers by a large amount – thereby
mitigating one of the two major drawbacks associated with
symbolic execution, the other being path-explosion.
Additionally, we found that, in many of the programs with
high branching factors, sonar-search strategy made sure
that many function nodes below frontier nodes (defined in
section III-B3) in these programs were covered by KLEE in
the same run as that targeting these frontier nodes. This trend
indicates that with targeted symbolic execution, our hybrid
technique may be able to find paths to interesting targets
without getting “stuck” in shallow parts of a program due to
path-explosion.
A comparison with SF hybrid approach is excluded, because
the first step of symbolic execution would cover all functions
in a small amount of time, with the same number of queries
as above.
b) SMT solver queries and analysis time: Now we con-
sider the number of SMT queries generated by the symbolic
execution engine and the total analysis time taken by the four
compared techniques. Even though the number of generated
queries may not directly correlate with analysis time, we con-
sider this an important aspect because it points to the efficiency
with which diverse paths (and, hence, functions) are covered
in a complex program. We can see from tab. IV that the
number of SMT queries dramatically drops with the FS hybrid,
ranging from a drop by 45% to 98%. The number of queries
was trivially lower with SF hybrid because the maximum time
limit allowed here for symbolic execution itself was a fifth
(1 hour) of symbolic execution alone. Therefore, due to an
efficient implementation of sonar-search we were able to
reduce the number of paths and, hence, the number of SMT
queries generated by Munch.
For a fair comparison of the techniques, however, we have
to combine the number of SMT queries with total analysis
time. With a timeout of 2 minutes per target function with
sonar-search, FS hybrid was able to cover more functions
than KLEE or AFL in less than half the total time, on average.
SF hybrid, too, was able to cover more functions with only
one hour of symbolic execution with KLEE and one hour
of fuzzing (starting with more diverse seed inputs than AFL
alone) than KLEE or AFL alone in less than half the total
time, on average.
3) Summary: With the above results, we were able to show
that, when analyzing a program for a less amount of time,
1) Overall function coverage achieved by both, FS and SF hy-
brids, were always better than, or as high as, those achieved by
fuzzing or symbolic execution alone. 2) Function coverage for
deep functions achieved by our hybrid techniques beat sym-
bolic execution or fuzzing alone, especially from the perspec-
tive of rate of drop in function coverage as we go deeper in the
call-graph. 3) The number queries generated for SMT solver
was reduced by 80% on average. 4) Using Munch framework,
therefore, increases the chances that vulnerabilities may be
spotted in more functions at all depths of the program rather
than either only at low depths (as is the case with symbolic
execution alone) or high depths but not for many branches (as
is the case with fuzzing alone), using considerably fewer calls
to the SMT solver and in much less time.
C. Discussion and Limitations
We see from the evaluation presented above that a hybrid
framework that combines fuzzing and symbolic execution
leads to higher function coverage at a much lower cost than
either of the two involved techniques employed alone. When
we look at the coverage intersections in fig. 2, however, we
can also observe that the hybrid technique does not always
cover many functions that could not also have been covered
by AFL or KLEE alone. However, we must note that this
limitation is not due to a conceptual flaw in the design, but
due to limitations in KLEE. KLEE, with its default search
strategy, only updates the paths to uncovered states once every
30 seconds. Our search strategy, (sonar-search), on the
other hand, always calculates precise distances, which leads
to thousands of calculations that could not be cached across
multiple runs of KLEE (one run for every target function) with
sonar-search. However, for symbolic execution alone,
KLEE is only run once on the whole program and, therefore,
can cache SMT queries that have been solved in the past.
Without a caching mechanism working between several runs,
targeted symbolic execution spends most of the time analyzing
initial parts of a program multiple times to calculate shortest
paths to target functions. This limitation of KLEE, in fact,
shows the hybrid method in an even better light when seen
from the perspective of queries issued to the SMT solver (last
three columns in tab. IV). Symbolic execution, by itself, was
able to cache a lot of queries during execution which it did
not have to issue to the SMT solver when encountered again
(e.g., when popping a function from the stack). Even with this
advantage over targeted search (having to issue fewer queries
to SMT solver), KLEE takes more time than Munch to cover
new functions, overall.
AFL also comes with some design peculiarities that might
have contributed to low coverage in deep functions. The tech-
nical whitepaper of AFL [1] states that its execution schedule
is optimized to not get stuck in those nodes in the control-
flow graph that increase the path coverage by a small enough
amount to not warrant further exploration. This avoidance
aspect of AFL may be responsible for low coverage in high
depths of call-graph during, both, SF and FS modes of opera-
tion. Another drawback of AFL that might affect Munch is its
insistence on either STDIN or file based inputs, but not both.
Because of this some functions in the program that may only
be triggered by a certain combination of, both, command line
arguments and file inputs are not covered with either hybrid
modes.
Therefore, we have shown in our results that hybrid ap-
proaches, as implemented in Munch, involving symbolic exe-
cution and fuzzing may be, in the context of the analyzed pro-
grams, more effective and efficient in terms of deeper function
coverage than fuzzing or symbolic execution alone.
V. RELATED WORK
a) Fuzzing: Fuzzing was first used as a variant of ran-
domized testing for the reliability of UNIX tools by Miller
et al. [20]. Since then, many fuzzing (or blackbox fuzzing)
implementations, such as [3, 4], have been developed for dif-
ferent target-systems and applications. One of the most popular
fuzzers in academia and industry currently is AFL [1], which
uses genetic algorithms and instrumentation for an improving
path coverage and vulnerability discovery.
b) Symbolic execution: Symbolic execution, introduced
by King [16], deterministically analyzes a program by repre-
senting its paths as constraint systems that are solved (using
constraint solvers) to generate test cases executing those paths.
Concolic execution [9], whitebox fuzzing [15] and bounded
model checkers (BMC) [7] are some practical approaches to
symbolic execution that have been proposed in the past. Due
to a whitebox view of the program-under-test, symbolic ex-
ecution is, theoretically, able to cover more diverse branches
than fuzzing, but suffers from two particular problems – path-
explosion [10] and inefficient constraint solving [5, 24]. To
overcome path-explosion, many approaches have been pro-
posed such as [17, 27, 14], out of which compositional analysis
is one. Compositional symbolic execution, which is a building
block of our technique, breaks down a large program into
smaller components (e.g. functions) such that these compo-
nents can be analyzed in isolation from one another, thereby
reducing the number of paths to be explored, and their results
are composed together. Various evaluations of compositional
symbolic execution approach [12, 21, 25] have shown that it
is more effective at increasing coverage and finding low-level
vulnerabilities than forward symbolic execution.
c) Hybrid methods: The main distinction between
Munch and most other hybrid techniques that have been pro-
posed over the past decade is that our framework can be used
in two different modes of operation based on the availability
of diverse test-cases. An early hybrid of symbolic execution
and random testing was introduced by Majumdar and Sen
in 2007 [19] where the authors proposed applying concolic
execution after random testing reaches a saturation point. How-
ever, robust implementations of fuzzing (successor of random
testing) were only introduced in later years, so as to make
the above technique more efficient. In [13] a hybrid method
is introduced which employs symbolic execution to increase
the “breadth” of coverage in binaries when fuzzing does not
increase the basic-block coverage. Our FS hybrid improves
this by directing execution towards the uncovered basic-blocks
or functions and, therefore, avoiding those blocks which had
already been covered with fuzzing. In [22], Pak develops and
evaluates an equivalent of SF hybrid strategy, but not FS.
Wang et al. [30] present a hybrid approach applicable for pro-
grams dealing with input-dependant checksum operations. Our
framework, in principle, works for any C program, including
the ones containing checksum operations. Bo¨ttinger and Eckert
[8] propose a hybrid method that is able to find vulnerabilities
deep inside a program. However, the difference between [8]
and our paper is that the symbolic execution search strategy
is guided in [8] by assigning likelihoods to paths that may
execute yet undiscovered (possible) vulnerabilities, and we use
instrumentation and function coverage for the same. In [23] the
authors introduce a whitebox fuzzing strategy, called Model-
based Whitebox Fuzzing (MoWF). MoWF uses model-based
file description to overcome the shallow parts of any program
that guard their specific (deep) functionality and then uses
symbolic execution. Like target-function guided symbolic ex-
ecution, input models can also help in reducing the constraint
space. None of the above works are accompanied by open-
source implementations, so a comparison w.r.t. our evaluation
metrics proved difficult.
In Driller [28], which is the closest to our framework,
Stephens et al. discover the same patterns about coverage-in-
depth as our work, and, hence, are able to find many more vul-
nerabilities than naı¨ve symbolic execution and fuzzing tools.
However, their symbolic execution exploration strategy (after
initial fuzzing) is guided by a taint analysis on the inputs
generated by the fuzzer, instead of a target-based directed strat-
egy. Because of relying on the inputs generated by the fuzzer,
instead of pre-calculating a call-graph and computing a differ-
ence set to determine targets of interest (uncovered functions
or basic blocks), Driller does not guarantee higher function
coverage, in general. We tried to apply Driller to our evaluation
set but were unable to do so because its open-source code base
is tailor-made for the authors’ distributed system set-up, and
not ready to use out-of-the-box. Munch, on the other hand, is
ready to be installed and used on any Linux-based system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed and evaluated Munch, a
hybrid framework for function coverage, based on fuzzing and
symbolic execution. This adaptive framework works in two
modes – fuzzing followed by targeted symbolic execution and
symbolic execution to generate diverse seed inputs for fuzzing.
Using our implementation of targeted search in symbolic ex-
ecution, the number of queries to the SMT solver, and, there-
fore, the time taken for symbolic execution, is reduced by only
focussing on those paths that may lead to uncovered functions.
We demonstrated the efficiency of Munch on 12 artificially
generated programs. We also evaluated it on 9 widely used
open-source programs for effectiveness and efficiency and
compared them to pure fuzzing and symbolic execution. We
found that, as shown in section IV-B, our hybrid approach suc-
cessfully achieves higher function coverage at all depths of a
program’s call-graph than either fuzzing or symbolic execution
alone, at less than half of the cost (time and SMT queries).
Looking at these results, we can posit that, with higher func-
tion coverage in highly compositional programs, our hybrid
technique is more likely to find vulnerabilities that fuzzing or
symbolic execution may miss when used by themselves.
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